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Abstract: 
This paper examines the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the timing and the price 
of the stock options they are granted at the time of their firm’s IPO. Contrary to Lowry and 
Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between IPO grants and IPO underpricing, this 
paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture-
capital (VC) back ing are taken into account. The results suggest that powerful CEOs and VCs 
are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options to the detriment of the shareholders. 
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Underpricing and CEO Stock Options: Do Board Characteristics Matter? 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The high levels of underpricing witnessed for initial public offerings (IPOs) during the late nineties have 
started a debate on the role of executives, especially powerful CEOs, in setting their firm’s offer price.1 If 
powerful CEOs set their own compensation package  (Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) , they 
should also be able  to time their option grants to coincide with their firm’s IPO and to set the options’ 
exercise price equal to a deliberately low offer price  so as to maximize their option gains (Lowry and 
Murphy, 2007). Powerful CEOs granting themselves IPO options at favorable terms may thus expropriate 
the firm’s pre-IPO shareholders not only via these IPO options grants, but also via higher levels of 
underpricing. This paper studies a representative sample of 435 firms going public during 1997-2004. In 
about 24% of the sample firms (104 firms), CEOs receive stock options around the IPO date. These stock 
options have an exercise price close to the offering price. Based on the first day underpricing, these IPO 
options provide CEOs with an average gain of $693,901, which represents 1% of the average IPO gross 
proceeds.   
This study analyses the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the offer price and the 
granting and timing of their stock options at the IPO. More specifically, it examines whether the 
                                                               
1  Bach and Smith (2007) define power as the capacity of the CEO to exert influence to change the behavior of a 
person or group in some intended way.  
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leadership and composition of the board of directors as well as the presence of VCs have an 
impact on the link between stock option grants and underpricing. 2  
 
The chief executive officer is typically the most powerful executive within a corporation (see e.g. 
Harrison et al., 1988). The power of the CEO is even greater in small firms, which typically lack 
the constraints associated with the more rigid organizational systems and structures found in 
larger firms (Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Founder-CEOs 
and CEOs who also act as chairmen of the board of directors are likely to be entrenched, 
resulting in higher underpricing (Certo et al., 2001), especially in firms where powerful CEOs 
are able to grant themselves IPO options. This paper finds a strong positive link between 
underpricing and the ex ante gain related to underpricing in firms with powerful CEOs who are 
founders, chairmen, or both.  
However, firms with good corporate governance, such as highly independent  boards of directors, 
may be able to counterbalance the power of the CEO (Core et al., 1999). This study measures 
board independence by the percentage of non-executives not linked to the firm’s venture 
capitalists (VCs). While the paper finds that underpricing increases with the ex ante gain from 
                                                               
2  A large number of IPO prospectuses indicate the explicit involvement of the board of directors in the 
determination of the number of stock options and their related exercise price. For example, the prospectus of 
Acadia Pharmaceutical (p,64, 5/26/2004) states that: “Options were granted by our board of directors at an 
exercise price determined by them in good faith to be the fair value of our common stock as of the date of grant. 
In determining the fair value of our common stock our board of directors evaluated a number of factors, 
including our financial condition and business prospects, our stage of development and achievement of key 
technical and business milestones, private and public market conditions, the terms of our private financings and 
the valuations of similar companies in our industry.” . 
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the number of IPO options, it is lower for firms with more independent boards of directors. This 
result supports the hypothesis that independent directors ensure that the CEO’s interests are 
aligned with those of the shareholders. However, the monitoring role of independent directors 
may be reduced by the presence of VCs. 
Indeed, while most VCs favor value-maximizing CEOs, some VCs may be mainly concerned 
with building up their reputational capital through a successful IPO. These VCs may therefore be 
more willing to bear the cost of underpricing (Gompers, 1996). They may bribe the CEO, e.g. via 
IPO options, to gain support for an early IPO which would leave more money on the table for the 
other shareholders.3 Our empirical results offer support for this argument as, in VC-backed firms, 
the impact of IPO options on underpricing is higher. In addition, robustness tests indicate that 
this effect is even stronger for firms backed by young VC firms. This is in line with recent 
evidence on the tendency of VCs with a lower reputation to grandstand and take companies 
public at an early stage in order to build their reputation (Gompers, 1996; and Lee and Wahal, 
2004). Further there is evidence that the impact of IPO option grants on IPO underpricing is 
stronger the more powerful the VC. This is the case for both measures of VC power used in this 
paper. First, a greater fraction of board seats held by the VCs in the issuing firms causes a higher 
impact of IPO options on underpricing. Second, the impact of IPO options is also stronger for 
firms whose CEO is linked to one of the VCs.  
                                                               
3  For CEOs with pre -IPO share ownership, IPO options may also be a way to compensate for the loss caused by 
the high underpricing. 
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In order to test the robustness of our results, we also look at stock options  granted before the IPO 
date. Almost half of the sample firms (49.6%) offer stock options to their CEOs during the year 
prior to the IPO. In support of the results obtained for IPO options, there is evidence suggesting 
that an independent board reduces the impact of CEO stock options on underpricing whereas the 
presence of VCs in the boardroom increases this impact.  
This paper contributes to the existing research in two major ways. First, in contrast to Lowry and 
Murphy (2007) who do not find a link between IPO options and underpricing, this paper finds 
strong evidence of such a link when adjusting for differences in the power of the CEO and VCs 
across IPO firms. As such, it suggests that the effectiveness of stock options in general, and IPO 
option grants in particular, as an incentivizing and monitoring tool needs to be studied in the 
context of the firm’s overall corporate governance. Second, this paper sheds additional light on 
the potential conflicts of interests that  VCs in IPO firms  may suffer from. The paper finds strong 
evidence that more powerful VCs use IPO options to bribe CEOs to agree to  an early IPO at a 
lower offer price. This effect is stronger for firms backed by young VC firms who are still  
build ing up their reputation through successful IPO exits and who are thus likely to grandstand 
and accept higher underpricing.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews the literature. Section I discusses the 
research methodology. Section III presents the empirical findings and Section IV provides details 
on the battery of tests conducted to ensure the robustness of the results. Section V concludes the 
paper. 
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II. Review of the literature  
Prior research suggests that CEOs have a strong influence on firm performance (Daily and 
Johnson, 1997), especially in small firms where they are the locus of control and decision-
making (Daily et al., 2002). CEO compensation may be a mechanism to alter the risk-taking 
incentives of CEOs, who may otherwise be too conservative and shy away from risky but 
shareholder-value creating investments (Coles, Williams, and Sen, 2002).  
Stock options are contracts that give their holders the right to buy a specific number of shares at 
a predetermined price over a predetermined period. Stock options do not incur cash outlays until 
they are exercised, which results in less downside risk than equity (Certo et al., 2003), thus 
inducing risk-taking. Therefore, stock options are likely to align CEO and shareholder interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and provide IPO firms with “upside potential” (Sanders, 2001)  
which, by encouraging a higher propensity to take risks (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1994), may result in higher firm performance (Hall and Liebman, 1998).  
However, Yermack (1997) provides strong evidence that executives are self serving. They 
influence the timing of option grants and are likely to receive ‘in the money’ options just prior to 
releasing news that increases their company’s share price, thereby maximizing their option gains. 
Lowry and Murphy (2007) argue that, via underpricing at the IPO, CEOs generate themselves 
gains from IPO options by setting the  options’ exercise price equal to the offer price. Lowry and 
Murphy (2007) expect a positive impact on underpricing of share options issued at the time of 
the IPO. However, their study of 854 companies over the period 1996-2000 suggests that IPO 
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underpricing is related neither to the existence nor the magnitude of IPO share option grants. 
This result is inconsistent with the ir argument that managers that have been granted stock options 
around the IPO have clear incentives to set a lower issue price in order to maximize their 
personal wealth.  
Given the potentially perverse incentives generated by stock options, outside investors may insist 
on additional monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the CEO has the right incentives to 
maximize firm value. For example, the board of directors, provided that it has sufficient  
independence, may help mitigate the agency problems generated by the separation of ownership 
and control and improve firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). More specifically, non-executive directors are likely to complement the 
executives’ technical competencies and good knowledge of the firm. They also allow for greater 
objectivity in assessing the behavior of managers, and operate as a signal of effective monitoring 
and control systems in IPO firms (Daily et al., 1999). Therefore, investors may prefer IPO firms 
with more independent boards (Gompers, 1995) that are more likely to ensure the effectiveness 
of CEO stock options (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). In support of this argument, Filatotchev and 
Bishop (2002) find that board impendence reduces IPO underpricing. Further, Core et al. (1999) 
find that both the characteristics of the board of directors and the ownership structure have a 
significant impact on the level of CEO compensation. They show that CEOs earn more and that 
they perform worse when governance structures are less effective. 
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The presence of VC firms may also affect board composition and leadership. Hellmann and Puri 
(2002) find tha t VC-backing is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as 
human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. 
VC involvement in the firm’s strategy and organization, including the granting of IPO options, is 
more likely when VCs are on the board of directors (Fried et al., 1998). Moreover, VCs often 
play a significant role in persuading founder-CEOs to step down prior to the IPO in favor of 
more experienced and credible executives in order to manage the IPO process (Jain and Tabak, 
2008). To summarize, there is ample evidence of substantial involvement by VCs in their 
investee firms. Powerful VCs may then grandstand and take their investee companies public at 
an early stage in order to build up their reputation and attract more funds for further investments 
(Gompers, 1996; and Lee and Wahal, 2004). VCs may therefore issue IPO options to the CEOs 
of their investee firms and issue them at an exercise price equal to a deliberately low offer price 
in order to bribe or compensate the CEO for his support for an early IPO. Hence, VCs may have 
a positive effect on the link between underpricing and the gain from IPO option grants. This 
positive link may be further intensified if the CEO is related to the VC. For example, for IPO 
firms whose CEO is a partner of the VC, the IPO options would directly compensate the VC for 
any money left on the table due to the early IPO. 
Furthermore, board efficiency declines as the CEO gains power over the board (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). For example,  a CEO serving as chairman of the board may intentionally 
appoint board members who will be less likely to monitor the management (Prevost, Rao and 
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Hossain, 2002). As such, the potentially negative impact of this dual leadership structure on 
corporate governance may also increase underpricing (Certo, Daily and Dalton, 2001). In support 
of this argument, Core et al. (1999) find that CEO compensation is higher when the CEO is also 
the board’s chair. Stock options granted at the time of the IPO may thus increase the potential for 
conflicts of interests in firms with a dual leadership structure, and may thus increase IPO 
underpricing. Board efficiency is also likely to be lower in IPO firms with founder-CEOs. Based 
on a sample of Fortune 500 firms, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) provide evidence on the 
entrenchment of founder-CEOs: firms with founder-CEOs have lower turnover and are less 
likely to be the target of a hostile takeover. Although founder-CEOs often consider their firms to 
be their life achievement and are thus likely to focus on long-term value maximizing rather than 
short-term objectives, there is empirical evidence on higher underpricing in founder-CEOs’ 
IPOs. Since founder-CEOs who take their firms public are basically doing so for the first time, 
they represent “untested managers” (Wat, 1983). This leads to greater uncertainty (Tashakori, 
1980), and increases the risk aversion of underwriters about the quality of an issue, thus inducing 
higher underpricing. Within this context, founder-CEOs who are granted stock options at the IPO 
may be seen as opportunistic managers using the options to generate gains that offset the wealth 
loss from underpricing due to their pre-IPO ownership. As such, the presence of a founder-CEO 
may positively affect the impact of IPO grants on underpricing.  
Based on the above discussion, we propose to test the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Underpricing is positively related to the IPO option-related gains 
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Hypothesis 2: Underpricing is negatively related to the IPO option-related gains in firms with 
more independent boards of directors 
Hypothesis 3: Underpricing is positively related to the IPO option-related gains in IPOs with 
greater involvement by venture capital firms 
Hypothesis 4: Underpricing is positively related to the IPO option-related gains in IPOs with 
greater CEO entrenchment 
III. Data and Methodology 
A. Data Sources 
To form the IPO sample, we first collect data on all IPOs during 1997-2004 in the US markets 
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. Similar to Lowry and Murphy (2007), we 
exclude REITs, ADRs, closed-end funds, foreign IPOs, unit offerings, financial IPOs, and those 
with a lower-than- five dollars offer price. This leaves 1725 IPOs. The data on CEO stock 
options, ownership, and other IPO characteristics is collected from the IPO prospectuses as well 
as the  proxy statement for the fiscal year of the IPO, which are available from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and  Retrieval system 
(EDGAR).  
Since the primary focus of the paper is on the effect of board composition and CEO and VC 
power on stock option grants around the IPO date and in turn their effect on IPO underpricing, 
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the analysis is based on a representative sample of 435 IPOs for which the IPO prospectuses 
show stable leadership , i.e. no board changes during the year prior to the IPO. As the IPO 
process takes several months of negotiation and preparation, focusing on firms with stable boards 
allows for the board to assume its full monitoring role. The final sample represents 25.2% of the 
entire IPO population during the period under study and consists of 435 IPOs. Table I compares 
the sample to the entire IPO population. The table shows that the sample has a distribution of 
IPOs per year and per industry similar to the population. It also shows that both have similar  
percentages of hi-tech and VC-backed IPOs, which confirms the representativeness of the 
sample. Hence, we are confident that the sample is representative of the population of IPOs. 
[Table I about here] 
For each IPO, we hand-collect data on the compensation scheme of the CEO from the prospectus 
as well as the proxy statement that covers the fiscal year of the IPO. We also collect the number 
of shares held by the CEO as well as the other pre-IPO shareholders, such as the VCs, 
immediately before and after the IPO. Data is also collected on all stock options granted in the 
year prior to the IPO date as well as on the IPO options most usually issued on (or within a few 
days of) the offering date. The board’s composition is also collected from the IPO prospectus, by 
consulting the footnotes of both the “MANAGEMENT” and “PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS” 
tables in order to have data that is as accurate as possible. 
B. Methodology 
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The main aim of the paper is to explain the link between underpricing and IPO options by 
adjusting for the influence of board independence, VC involvement and managerial 
entrenchment on both. The three models which we estimate are as follows : 
Underpricingi = a + ß1 x Ex ante Gain from Underpricing i + ß2 x Board Independencei    
 + ß3 x Ex ante Gain from Underpricingi x Board Independencei  
 + ß4 x CEO Pre-IPO Ownershipi + ß5 x Control variablesi + ei  (1) 
Underpricingi = a + ß1 x Ex ante Gain from Underpricingi + ß2 x VC Involvement i    
 + ß3 x Ex ante Gain from Underpricingi x VC Involvementi  
 + ß4 x CEO Pre-IPO Ownershipi + ß5 x Control variablesi + ei  (2) 
Underpricingi = a + ß1 x Ex ante Gain from Underpricing i + ß2 x CEO Entrenchment i    
 + ß3 x Ex ante Gain from Underpricingi x CEO Entrenchmenti  
 + ß4 x CEO Pre-IPO Ownershipi + ß5 x Control variablesi + ei  (3) 
Model (1), (2) and (3) test the validity of Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In line with the 
prior IPO literature, the dependent variable, Underpricing, is equal to the ratio of the difference 
between the price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. 
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Lowry and Murphy (2007) argue that a CEO receiving IPO options with an exercise price equal 
to the offer price benefits from higher underpricing as each IPO option generates a gain equal to 
the dollar amount of underpricing. Conversely , CEO wealth is adversely affected by the new 
shares sold at the too low offer price (Barry, 1989). In order to calculate the net gain from 
underpricing, we follow Lowry and Murphy (2007, p.45), and compute the hypothetical gains 
and losses from each $1 decrease in the offer price (holding the aftermarket price constant) as 
follows. 
Ex ante Gain = Number of IPO Options      (4) 
Ex ante Loss = Number of Shares + Number of New Shares x CEO’s Portion of Total     (5) 
    CEO Sold in IPO     Offered in IPO        Shares Retained in 
         Company 
The Ex ante Gain from Underpricing, i.e. the IPO option-related gain, is calculated as the 
number of IPO options. The Ex ante Loss from Underpricing is the number of secondary shares 
sold by the CEO plus the number of primary shares offered in the IPO multiplied by the CEO’s 
portion of shares he retains in the company (including options granted prior to the IPO and 
excluding all secondary shares) and it is the direct wealth effect of underpricing on CEO 
ownership prior to the IPO date. 
Board Independence is equal to the number of non-executive and non-VC related board directors 
expressed as a proportion of the total number of board members. Outside directors exclude VC-
related board members.  
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VC involvement is measured by a VC dummy and the proportion of VC-related directors. The 
VC dummy is equal to one if an IPO firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise. This dummy is used 
to identify the role played by venture capital firms. Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that 
venture capitalists act as a third party certifying agent, reduc ing asymmetric information and thus 
underpricing. Venture capitalists may, however, have other motives such as building up their 
reputation. Younger VCs may therefore grandstand and take firms public earlier than expected 
which results in higher underpricing (Gompers, 1996). In robustness tests, we use the age of VC 
firms which is collected from SDC Platinum Venture Expert database to control for VC 
reputation. The age of a VC firm is equal to the difference between the IPO date and the 
founding date of the VC firm. We use Old VC dummy (Young VC dummy) which is equal to 1 if 
the average age of VC firms for a specific IPO is higher (lower) than the median age of VC firms 
in the sample, and zero otherwise. 
CEO entrenchment is measured by three separate dummy variables. The CEO Founder dummy is 
set to one if the CEO is also the  firm’s founder. The CEO Chairman dummy equals one if the 
CEO also assumes the role of company chairman, and equals zero otherwise. Finally, the CEO 
Founder Chairman dummy equals one if the CEO happens to be both the founder and chairman 
of the firm, and is zero otherwise. 
Prior research shows evidence that underpricing depends on firm characteristics and market 
conditions. Hence, we control for price revision, CEO pre-IPO ownership, firm age, industry, 
size (proxied by the sales revenue for the year prior to the IPO), overhang, participation ratio, use 
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of proceeds,  pre-IPO leverage, and market conditions. In addition, we use the same control 
variables as those used by Lowry and Murphy (2007): they use a VC dummy, underwriter 
reputation, industry membership, and year dummies.   
Price Revision is equal to the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the mid-point of 
the initial price range over the latter. Hanley (1993) argues that price revision may be used as a 
proxy for investor feedback and notes that Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model of book 
building predicts partial adjustment to private information. As such, price revision controls for 
the information gathering during the pre-IPO period.  
Prior research also suggests that CEO ownership is a possible way to reduce the agency 
problems caused by the separation of ownership and control (Oswald and Jahera, 1991; Mehran, 
1995). Were therefore use a Pre-IPO CEO Ownership variable, which is equal to the percentage 
of shares owned by the CEO before the IPO as reported in the IPO prospectus.  
Pre-IPO Sales is the proxy for firm size and is the natural logarithm of sales (or revenue) during 
the year prior to the IPO. Since there is typically more information available to the public about 
larger firms, larger firms should have lower underpricing. A Hi-Tech dummy is added to control 
for the presence of higher asymmetric information in such firms and its likely effect on 
underpricing. It is equal to one if the IPO firm is a hi-tech firm, and zero otherwise.4  
                                                               
4  In line with Loughran and Ritter (2004), Hi-Tech stocks are defined as those with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 
3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and 
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Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the sale of secondary shares by the existing shareholders 
represents a negative signal about the firm value and that the signal is stronger the higher the 
percentage of secondary shares sold . On the contrary, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) find evidence 
that pre-IPO shareholders who participate to a larger extent in the offering, i.e. by selling more of 
their existing shares, are more concerned about the wealth loss from underpricing. In particular, 
they are likely to pay higher marketing costs to entice uninformed investors to invest in the IPO, 
thereby reduc ing underpricing. Therefore, we use the Participation Ratio, which is equal to the 
number of existing shares sold expressed as a fraction of the total number of shares offered in the 
IPO. We also consider Overhang, which is defined as the ratio of pre-IPO shares retained over 
the shares issued in the IPO. In line with Bradley and Jordan (2002), firms with greater overhang 
suffer less dilution, which suggests that the cost of underpricing is lower and the level of 
underpricing is likely to be greater.   
Leone et al. (2007) document substantial variation in the specificity of disclosures on the use of 
proceeds and find a negative association between such specificity and underpricing. They argue 
that IPOs that provide specific use-of-proceeds disclosures have less ex ante uncertainty, as these 
voluntary disclosures help investors estimate the distribution of secondary market values. This 
paper uses Specific Use of Proceeds as a control variable, which is equal to the fraction of IPO 
proceeds designated for a specific use such as expansion, acquisitions, R&D, product 
development, advertising, marketing, promotion or sales, working capital use, and other uses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 
(communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
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Prior research ind icates that pre-IPO leverage may play a monitoring role (Jensen, 1986), thus 
mitigating underpricing. Pre-IPO Leverage is equal to pre-IPO long-term debt as a percentage of 
pre-IPO total assets. 
Underwriter Rank ing is calculated as in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), with more reputable underwriters certifying the quality of managed offerings and thus 
have a lower underpricing. Underwriter Ranking is a dummy variable equal to one for the most  
prestigious underwriters, and zero otherwise.  
Market Return is the compounded return of the value-weighted CRSP index over the 20 trading 
days preceding the day of the IPO. It controls for the effect of market momentum and is expected 
to affect underpricing positively (Logue, 1973; Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002, Lowry 
and Schwert, 2004). A Bubble Period Dummy is also included in the regressions. It controls for 
the effect of the internet bubble in 1999-2000, when underpricing was highest. 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table II presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample as well as the sub-samples of 
firms with and without IPO options. Panel A shows that average underpricing is 37.6% for the 
entire sample following an average price revision of 6.2% during the pre-IPO period. While the 
average underpricing for the firms with CEO IPO options is lower (30.6%) than that for the firms 
without IPO options (39.8%), the difference is not significant. Further, the median underpricing 
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for both sub-samples is virtually identical. This result is in line with Lowry and Murphy (2007) 
who also do not find a difference in underpricing between firms with and without IPO options. 
Panel B reports that 63.4% of the sample firms are VC-backed IPOs as evidenced by the VC 
dummy and a lower percentage of firms with IPO options (52.95) is backed by VCs than firms 
without IPO options (66.8%). VC board representation makes out on average 20.8% of the board 
seats, and as such, 46.3% of board directors are likely to be truly independent. Firms without IPO 
options have a significantly higher percentage of VC representatives (22%) compared to firms 
with IPO options (16.9%), reflecting the higher percentage of VC-backed firms in the former 
sub-sample. According to Panel C, 6.4% of the CEOs are linked to one of the VC firms. 
Although the percentage of VC-related CEOs is economically higher (9.6%) for the firms with 
IPO options compared to the firms without IPO options (5.4%), the difference is not statistically 
significant. Founder-CEOs are present in 39.1% of the sample whereas 51% of the CEOs also act 
as chairmen of the board. About 26.7% of the CEOs are both chairmen and founders. None of 
these CEO characteristics differs significantly across the two sub-samples. Interestingly, there is 
no significant difference in terms of CEO pre-IPO ownership between the two sub-samples: the 
CEOs of both types of firms own roughly 20% of the shares before the IPO. There is also no 
difference in CEO ownership after the IPO.  
Panel C also reports the descriptives for IPO grants, stock options granted during the year 
preceding the IPO and those granted more than one year before the IPO. The table reveals two 
patterns. First, the CEOs of firms with IPO options have significantly more options when options 
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are aggregated across the three periods. Second, these CEOs also have significantly fewer 
options granted more than one year before the IPO. Further, when one ignores IPO options 
altogether, firms with IPO options have a higher percentage (77%) of IPOs granted in the year 
before the IPO than those without IPO options (67%).5 Hence, there is some evidence that firms 
with IPO options tend to time their options closer to the IPO.  
[Table II about here] 
Panel D of Table II reports descriptive statistics on the offering characteristics. There are no 
significant differences in terms of sales revenue, pre-IPO leverage, overhang, underwriter 
ranking and gross proceeds. However, as one would expect from the above analysis of the 
evolution of CEO ownership, firms with IPO options have a higher participation ratio. The 
fraction of the IPO proceeds designated for a specific use is also higher for firms with IPO 
options. Conversely, there are more hi- tech firms among the firms without IPO options.  
Finally, while Panel E does not report a significant difference in terms of market conditions 
when these are measured by the market return over the 20 days preceding the IPO, it reports a 
significantly higher percentage (46.5% vs. 24%) of firms without IPO options going public 
during the bubble period.  
Table III presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of 104 IPOs whose CEOs receive IPO 
option grants at the time of the IPO. Panel A is on the offer characteristics. The average (median) 
                                                               
5  These percentages are obtained as follows: 77% = 0.010 / (0.003 + 0.010) and 67% = 0.014 / (0.007 + 0.014). 
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initial underpricing is $5.50 ($0.84) per share which amounts to an average (median) of $31 
million ($1.8 million) left on the table on the first day of trading. Panel B reports information on 
the IPO options grants. CEOs are granted an average of 149,163 options at the time of the IPO 
with an exercise price that is on average 2.91% lower than the offer price. Panel C shows that 
CEOs make an average (median) gain of $693,901 ($55,306) from their IPO options during the 
first day of trading. Interestingly, this gain exceeds the average loss suffered by the CEOs from 
underpricing, and results on average in a net gain of $167,983. Based on the SEC stock option 
valuation method, and assuming a 10% growth rate of the stock price till maturity, Panel D of 
Table III reports an average gain of $3.011 million, which is equal to the difference between the 
total value of the IPO options and their cost based on their exercise price. Further, controlling for 
the loss due to CEO pre-IPO ownership ($525,917 on average), the CEO makes an average 
(median) net gain of $2.485 million ($1.416 million). The results in Table III suggest that firms 
with IPO options pay their CEOs, on average, 1% (the first trading day gain of the IPO option) to 
4.5% (the theoretical value of the IPO options minus their cost) of the gross proceeds.   
[Table III about here] 
Table IV reports underpricing in relation to (above- and below-median) board independence and 
the existence of IPO grants (Panel A) as well as in relation to VC backing and the existence of 
IPO grants (Panel B). Panel A shows that firms with high board independence (sub-samples III 
and IV) have significantly lower underpricing (at the 1% confidence level) than those with lower 
board independence (sub-samples I and II). Panel A also suggests that underpricing for firms 
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with high board independence as well as IPO options (sub-sample IV) is significantly lower (at 
the 5% level or better) compared to  all the other sub-sample s. This result suggests that 
underpricing is lowest for those firms with high board independence that grant their CEOs IPO 
options. However at first sight, there are also some conflicting results in Panel A. Indeed, the 
level of underpricing is virtually identical across firms with IPO options (sub-sample I) and those 
without IPO options (sub-sample II), when board independence is low. This is in direct 
contradiction with Hypothesis 1 which states that underpricing should increase in line with IPO 
option-related gains. Further, when board independence is high, firms with IPO options actually 
have significantly lower underpricing. Again, this pattern contradicts Hypothesis 1. 6,7  
However, when the characteristics of sub-samples I and II are compared, there are significant 
differences. Indeed, firms from the former sub-sample are more likely to be VC-backed (at the 
10% level of confidence), more likely to go public during the bubble period (at the 5% level) and 
have less post-IPO CEO ownership (at the 10% level). Similarly, there are significant differences 
between sub-samples I and IV. Firms from the former sub-sample are smaller for both measures 
of size – total assets (at the 10% level) and sales (at the 1% level), they are also more likely to be 
VC-backed (at the 1% level), more likely to go public during the bubble period (at the 1% level) 
                                                               
6  Finally, to a lesser extent, the fact that firms with low board independence and no IPO options (sub-sample I) 
have significantly higher underpricing than firms with high board independence and with IPO options somewhat 
contradicts Hypothesis 2. Indeed, if Hypothesis 2 is valid, one would expect that the high board independence 
counteracts the posit ive effect of IPO options on underpricing, thereby rendering levels of underpricing which 
are no different from those in firms with no IPO options. 
7  These conflicting results remain when median underpricing rather than average underpricing is considered. 
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and more likely to be high-tech firms (at the 1% level). 8 This suggests that these contradictory 
results may be due to the fact that differences in underpricing across the four sub-samples are 
also to a large extent driven by differences in firm characteristics which Table IV does not adjust 
for. Hence, it is important to adjust for these firm characteristics in the regressions.  
 [Table IV about here] 
Panel B shows the average underpricing in relation to VC backing and the existence of IPO 
options. Interestingly, VC-backed firms (both sub-samples III and IV) have significantly higher 
underpricing (at the 1% level) than IPOs without VC backing (sub-samples I and II). However, 
there is no significant difference in terms of underpricing between firms with and without IPO 
option grants. Overall, Table IV suggests that board independence has a significantly negative 
effect on underpricing while VC backing has a significantly positive effect on underpricing. Both 
patterns hold irrespective of the presence or absence of IPO options.  
A. Regression Results 
Board Independence and IPO Option Grants 
Table V controls for the effect of IPO options on underpricing using the methodology of Lowry 
and Murphy (2007). Model (1) shows the results from regressing underpricing on the ex ante 
gain and loss from underpricing as well as the control variables. The coefficient on the ex ante 
                                                               
8  There are also significant differences in firm characteristics between sub-samples III and IV. IPO firms in sub-
sample III are more likely to be hi-tech firms, VC-backed and are more likely to go public during the bubble 
period than those in sub -sample IV. 
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loss variable is significant, which suggests that CEOs are less likely to accept underpricing when 
this results in a higher loss from underpricing via their pre-IPO ownership. There is however no 
significant association between underpricing and the ex ante gain from underpricing. Model (2)  
includes an interaction term between the ex ante gain and the independent board dummy, which 
is equal to one if board independence is higher than the sample median of 0.467, and zero 
otherwise. Model (2) shows that underpricing increases with the Ex ante Gain from 
Underpricing, whereas it is lower for IPOs with a higher ex ante gain and more independent 
boards, which is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results suggest that increasing the 
number of IPO options by one thousand increases underpricing by 0.275% for firms with less 
independent boards, and reduces underpricing by 0.299% (0.275% – 0.574%) for firms with 
more independent boards. This suggests that CEOs grant themselves IPO options in firms with 
lower monitoring.  Although not tabulated, using an IPO option dummy as a substitute for the ex 
ante gain variable yields qualitatively similar results, albeit with weaker economic significance.9 
[Table V about here] 
The results pertaining to the control variables are consistent with those from the existing 
literature. For instance, as shown in Table V, there is a negative link between underpricing and 
the independent board dummy (p=1%). This result is consistent with the monitoring role played 
by independent board members. In line with the information gathering hypothesis (Hanley, 
                                                               
9  In line with Lowry and Murphy (2007), we examine the effect of a joint endogeneity of IPO option grants and 
underpricing, and find results consistent with the complementary role played by board independence. The 
results are available upon request. We also rerun the regressions using IPO options granted to all the executives 
rather than just the CEO and find consistent but slightly less significant results. 
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1993), underpricing is positively related to price revision (p=1%). It is also negatively related to 
the size of the IPO firm (p=10%), to the fraction of secondary shares sold (p=5%), as well as the 
percentage of specific use of the proceeds (p=1%). Pre-IPO leverage also seems to play a 
monitoring role as it reduces underpricing (p=10%). Underpricing is higher in hi-tech IPOs 
(p=10%), and those managed by more reputable underwriters (p=5% ). It is also higher for firms 
going public during the bubble period (p=1%) or following a positive market return (p=5%).  
While Panel A of Table IV reported some patterns in the data which seemed to be in 
contradiction with Hypotheses 1 and 2, Table V provides strong support for both hypotheses. 
Table V also suggests a reason why the results change so dramatically across the two tables. 
Indeed, the regression results suggest that it is important to adjust for firm characteristics as 
several of these are significant in the regressions. These include firm size (log of sales), the high-
tech dummy and the bubble dummy. A closer analysis of the sub-samples in Panel A of Table IV 
revealed significant differences in precisely these variables across the sub-samples. 
Venture Capital Involvement and IPO Option Grants 
We test whether the monitoring role played by board independence is still effective in the case 
where VC-related board members are included among the independent directors (the results are 
not tabulated). We find evidence to the contrary. This suggests that VC-related directors may 
collude with the CEO and support the distribution of stock options at the time of the IPO.  
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Table VI further investigates whether there is a differential effect of VC involvement at the IPO 
on the link between IPO option grants and underpricing. VC involvement is proxied by the 
following three variables: (1) the VC-related Directors dummy, which is  equal to one, if the 
percentage  of VC-related directors on the board of directors is higher than the median value of 
16.7%, and zero otherwise ; (2) the VC dummy, which is equal to one if the IPO firm is VC-
backed, and zero otherwise; and (3) the CEO related to VCs dummy, which is  equal to one if the 
CEO is related to one of the VC firms backing the firm, and zero otherwise.  
[Table VI about here] 
Model (3) in Table VI shows that underpricing is higher in firms where the VC-related directors 
dummy is equal to one (p=1%), i.e. when the percentage of VC-related directors on the board of 
directors is higher than the sample median of 16.7%. However, underpricing is not related to the 
VC dummy and the CEO related to VCs dummy (Models (4) and (5), respectively).  More 
importantly, Models (3), (4) and (5) confirm Hypothesis 3 as underpricing is positively related to 
the interaction terms between Ex ante Gain from Underpricing and each of the VC 
characteristic s (p=10%). The results suggest that VC-backed IPOs whose CEOs are granted 
stock options around the IPO have higher underpricing. The involvement of VCs with the board 
of directors as well as the relation they may have with the CEO seem to result in the granting of 
IPO options with an exercise price equal to a deliberately underpriced offer price. The results 
also suggest that increasing the number of granted IPO options by one thousand decreases 
underpricing by 0.252% for firms with fewer VC-related directors, which are likely to have more 
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independent boards, and increases underpricing by 0.284% (-0.252% + 0.536%) for firms with 
more VC-related directors. In the latter firms, IPO options might therefore be used by the VCs as 
a tool to gain the CEO’s support for their grandstanding strategy.  
CEO Characteristics and IPO Options 
In addition to VC grandstanding, underpricing may also be the consequence of powerful CEOs 
who do not act in the best interest of the existing shareholders. The entrenchment of the CEO is 
likely to be higher if he is also the founder, chairman, or both. In turn, higher CEO entrenchment 
may result in higher underpricing. Table VII presents the results from the regressions which 
allow for the possible differential effect of CEO characteristics on the link between underpricing 
and the ex ante gain from the IPO option grants.  
[Table VII about here] 
Table VII focuses on the three following CEO characteristics: (1) CEO-founders, (2) CEOs who 
are also chairmen of the board, and (3) CEOs who are both founders and chairmen (Models 6, 7 
and 8 respectively). In line with Hypothesis 4, Table VII shows that underpricing is positively 
related to the interaction variables between the Ex ante Gain from Underpricing and each of the 
three CEO characteristics (p=10% ). The relevant coefficients suggest that, increasing the number 
of IPO options by 10%, increases underpricing from between 4.74% and 6.98% for firms with a 
powerful CEO.  
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V. Robustness Tests 
A. VC reputation and IPO options 
Prior research suggests that grandstanding is negatively related to VC reputation. Gompers 
(1996) argues that, since fundraising is easier for older and more established VCs, younger VCs, 
with typically lower reputational capital, need to signal their quality through successful IPOs of 
their investee companies and are therefore more willing to bear the cost of higher underpricing. 
Gompers finds that younger VCs grandstand and take their portfolio companies public with 
higher underpricing. Lee and Wahal (2004) find evidence which is consistent with the 
grandstanding hypothesis as they report a negative coefficient on the interaction term between 
VC age and underpricing, and between the number of a VC’s prior IPOs and underpricing. Table 
VIII concentrates on VC age as an indicator for VC reputation. It repeats the regressions run in 
Table VI on the association between VC characteristics and IPO options and considers the 
differential effect of VC age . VC age is measured by two dummy variables: Old VC dummy and 
Young VC dummy which are set to one if the average VC age for a firm is higher and lower, 
respectively, than sample median VC age, and zero otherwise.  
[Table VIII about here] 
Table VIII shows evidence of a positive and significant link between underpricing and the 
interaction between the number of IPO options (the ex ante gain) and the  Young VC age. Hence, 
young and thus less prestigious VCs are more likely to grandstand and use IPO options as a way 
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to enforce the decision to go public at too low an offer price. When the number of previous ly 
backed IPOs I is used as a proxy for VC reputation, the results (which are not reported in a table) 
remain consistent but are slightly less significant.10   
B. Underpricing, Corporate Governance and CEO Stock Option Grants prior to the IPO 
The timing of stock options might not be limited to the short period surrounding stock offerings. 
Panel A of Table IX shows that the vast majority of issuing firms (70% or 304 IPOs) grant their 
CEOs stock options during the period before the IPO. CEOs hold on average 432,556 stock 
options in these 304 firms by the time the company decides to go public (2% of the total number 
of shares outstanding). In detail, 49% of the sample firms (214 IPOs) distribute an average of 
418,354 stock options to their CEO during the year prior to the IPO, and around 20% of the firms 
(90 IPOs) grant on average 293,958 stock options during the period before the year prior to the 
IPO.11 Panel B reports that these stock options have exercise prices which are highly discounted 
compared to the offer price, 1596% and 1235% on average for stock option grants before and 
during the one year prior to the IPO, respectively (an average 692% for all the stock options held 
                                                               
10  Further investigations use VC reputation as an instrumental variable to control for the endogenous decision to 
grant IPO options to CEOs, and confirm the main findings of the paper.  
11  The choice of “one Year prior to the IPO” relates to the fact that IPO prospectuses have usually more detailed 
information on the stock options distributed during the year prior to IPO than those distributed before this 
period. Out of the 90 firms that granted stock options during the period before the year preceding the IPO, 55 
granted stock options during the one year before the IPO and 14 granted options at the IPO. Out of the 214 firms 
that granted stock options during the year prior to the IPO, 55 granted options during the period one year before 
the IPO and 43 granted options at the IPO. Out of the 104 firms that granted IPO options, 14 granted options 
during the period one year before the IPO and 43 granted options during the one year before the IPO. There are 
only 8 firms that granted options during all three periods. 
 
 
28 
at the IPO). These figures compare to an average discount of only 2.91% for IPO options (see 
Panel B of Table II). 
[Table IX about here] 
In sum, CEOs are granted stock options with an average discount of $4,037,803 as measured by 
the difference between the offer price and the exercise price of the stock options (Panel C). 
These stock options have an average value that is $12.39 million higher than the offer price 
(Panel D), which represents a total gain of $16.43 million through stock option grants based on 
the SEC option pricing method (Panel E).  
Since stock options granted before the year prior to the IPO can be related to factors other than 
underpricing, Table X focuses on the impact on underpricing of both IPO options and stock 
options granted during the year prior to the IPO. Based on the entire sample of 435 IPOs, the 
regressions control for the (1) possible moderating effect of board independence, (2) the possible 
amplifying effect of the fraction of VC-related directors, and (3) the possible amplifying effect of 
the CEO founder-chairman dummy on the link between underpricing on the one hand and the 
value of both IPO option grants and option grants during the year prior to the IPO on the other 
hand.  
As stated above, the sample is selected from IPOs with a stable board composition and power of 
the CEO during the year prior to the IPO. While we expect various corporate governance 
mechanisms to affect the distribution of both types of stock options, they might not necessarily 
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affect those options granted before the year prior to the IPO. Hence, IPO underpricing might be 
affected by both IPO options and those granted during the year prio r to the IPO date. Also, Table 
X refers to stock option value (calculated as the difference between the option value according to 
the SEC method and the exercise price) and thus uses the total theoretical wealth granted to the 
CEO, rather than the difference between the offer price and the exercise price. 
[Table X about here] 
As predicted, Model (12) of Table X confirms the monitoring role played by an independent 
board, as measured by the Independent Board dummy, interacted with the value of IPO options 
and stock options granted during the year prior to the IPO. The coefficients are significantly 
negative at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Moreover, Model (13) indicates that 
underpricing is positively and significantly (at the 10% level) related to the interaction terms 
between the fraction of VC-related directors on the board, using the VC-related directors 
dummy, and the value of IPO options, and options granted during the year prior to the IPO. 
Finally, Model (14) shows that underpricing is positively related to the interaction term between 
the CEO founder-chairman dummy and the value of IPO option grants at the IPO (p=10%). 
These results confirm the previous results and lend further support for Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3. All in all, the regressions in Table X suggest that similar effects of option grants 
during the year before the IPO to those uncovered for IPO options.  
Interestingly, Models (12), (13) and (14) show that the value of stock options granted before the 
year prior to the IPO has a negative and significant (at the 10% level or better) effect on 
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underpricing. 12 The control variables show effects consistent with those reported in the previous 
tables.  
VI. Conclusion 
When do CEOs benefit from the stock options granted around an initial public offering? While 
prior research focuses on the association between IPO options and underpricing, this paper 
studies the conditions under which IPO options may cause higher IPO underpricing. While 
Lowry and Murphy (2007) do not find an effect of IPO options on underpricing, this study finds 
such a link when controlling for board independence, which is likely to counteract CEO power. 
More specifically, underpricing is positively related to the ex ante gain from the IPO option 
grants, but this link is relatively weaker in firms with greater board independence. This paper 
provides further evidence on the potential entrenchment or opportunistic behavior of the CEO as 
it finds higher underpricing in firms with IPO options and a CEO who is the founder and/or the 
chairman of the board of directors. 
The results also suggest the existence of a further conflict of interest relating to the use of stock 
options in IPOs. Indeed, for firms with VC backers, underpricing is positively related to the ex 
ante gain from IPO option grants, those with a greater percentage of VC-related directors, and 
those with a CEO related to one of the VCs. Interestingly, these relationships are stronger for 
                                                               
12  Panel C of Table II suggested that firms with IPO options grant significantly fewer options during the period 
preceding one year before the IPO. The above result seems to be in line with this pattern. 
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firms with younger, i.e. less reputable VCs, which is consistent with recent evidence on the 
grandstanding role played by venture capital firms.   
To summarize, this paper suggests that it is important to take account of potential conflicts of 
interest that the CEO and the VC backers may suffer from when assessing the impact of CEO 
IPO options on IPO underpricing. When taking account of these potential conflicts of interest, 
there is a strong positive effect of IPO options on underpricing.  
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Table I. Sample Representativeness 
This table compares the distribution across time and industries of the IPOs in the sample to that of the entire IPO 
population. *: data until 05/27/04       
                     Sample              Entire Population  
      (N=435)    (N=1725)   
  Year     No. %   No. %   
1997     171 39.31   455 26.38 
1998     50 11.49   257 14.90 
1999     87 20.00   444 25.74 
2000     92 21.15   342 19.83 
2001     6 1.38   70 4.06 
2002     7 1.61   61 3.54 
2003     8 1.84   52 3.01 
  2004*      14 3.22   44 2.55   
        
        
 Industry Classification     No. %   No. %   
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing   2 0.46   11 0.64 
Mining and Construction Industries  10 2.30   44 2.55 
Manufacturing     157 36.09   561 32.52 
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities  37 8.51   166 9.62 
Wholesale and Retail Trade    32 7.36   164 9.51 
Service Industries    197 45.29   779 45.16   
        
Hi-Tech IPOs     0.379    0.379 
        
VC-backed IPOs     0.634    0.618    
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Table II.  Descriptive Statistics of IPO firms        
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 435 IPOs as well for the sub-samples of IPOs with and without CEO IPO options from 1997 to 2004. Underpricing  is 
equal to the ratio of the difference between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. Price Revision is equal to the ratio of the 
difference between the offer price and the mid-point of the price range over the latter. VC dummy is equal to one if the IPO firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise. VC-related 
Directors is equal to the fraction of VC-related directors on the board. Board Independence is equal to the proportion of non-executive s and unrelated directors on the board. CEO 
related to VCs , CEO Founder dummy , CEO Chairman dummy, CEO Founder & Chairman dummy are dummy variables which are set to one if the CEO is related to one of the 
firm’s VCs, the CEO is the founder, the CEO is also the chairman, the CEO is the founder as well as the chairman, respectively, and zero otherwise. CEO Pre-IPO and CEO Post-
IPO Ownership  are calculated based on the pre-IPO and post-IPO number of shares outstanding (excluding all granted stock options), respectively. Pre-IPO (post-IPO) CEO stock 
option ownership  is the number of shares owned by the CEO before (after) the IPO expressed as a fraction of the sum of all pre-IPO (post-IPO) shares outstanding and all granted 
stock options. The number of stock options is reported according to the time it was granted and includes: Stock Options Granted  More than 1 Year before IPO, Stock Options 
Granted During 1 Year before IPO, IPO Stock Options, and All Granted Stock Options. Pre-IPO Sales Revenue  is the sales revenue for the year preceding the IPO. Pre-IPO 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt over total assets in the year preceding the IPO. Participation Ratio is equal to the fraction of shares sold by the existing shareholders. Overhang is 
defined as the number of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders divided by the shares issued in the IPO. Hi-tech dummy is equal to one if the IPO is a hi-tech firm, and zero 
otherwise. Underwriter Ranking is based on the ranking of Loughran and Ritter (2004). It is a dummy variable set to one for the most prestigious underwriters (class 9.1), and zero 
otherwise. Gross Proceeds is calculated based on the offer price. Specific Use of Proceeds is equal to the fraction of the IPO proceeds designated for a specific use such as 
expansion, acquisitions, R&D, product development, advertising, marketing, promotion or sales, working capital uses, and other uses. Market return  is the compounded daily 
return of a value weighted index over the 20 trading days preceding the day of the offer. Bubble dummy is equal to one is the IPO occurs during 1999-2000, and zero otherwise.  
       Entire Sample  IPOs with    IPOs without 
                      CEO IPO Options  CEO IPO Options  
       N = 435   N = 104   N = 331  P-Value   
       Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean  Median     of T-Diff 
       s.d.   s.d.   s.d.    
Panel A – IPO Price Discovery Process     
 Initial Underpricing      0.376 0.102  0.306 0.103  0.398 0.102   0.245 
       0.708   0.711   0.707    
 Price Revision      0.062 0.000  0.024 0.000  0.073 0.000   0.169 
       0.320   0.300   0.326    
Panel B – VC Involvement and Board Independence     
 VC dummy      0.634 1.000  0.529 1.000  0.668 1.000   0.010 
       0.482   0.502   0.472    
 VC-related Directors      0.208 0.167  0.169 0.000  0.220 0.200   0.034 
       0.212   0.207   0.213    
 Board Independence      0.463 0.467  0.481 0.500  0.457 0.444   0.341       
           0.223   0.225   0.222    
 
Panel C – CEO Characteristics      
 CEO related to VCs      0.064 0.000  0.096 0.000  0.054 0.000   0.131 
       0.246   0.296   0.227    
 CEO Founder dummy     0.391 0.000  0.365 0.000  0.399 0.000   0.544 
       0.488   0.484   0.490    
 CEO Chairman dummy     0.510 1.000  0.481 0.000  0.520 1.000   0.490 
       0.500   0.502   0.500    
 CEO Founder & Chairman dummy    0.267 0.000  0.279 0.000  0.263 0.000   0.748 
       0.443   0.451   0.441    
CEO Pre-IPO Ownership     0.205 0.100  0.232 0.092  0.197 0.102   0.213 
(Exc. All Granted Stock Options)     0.251   0.297   0.235    
CEO Post -IPO Ownership     0.157 0.093  0.167 0.083  0.154 0.093   0.473 
(Exc. All Granted Stock Options)     0.168   0.187   0.162    
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Table II—Continued 
       Entire Sample  IPOs with    IPOs without 
                      CEO IPO Options  CEO IPO Options  
       N = 435   N = 104   N = 331  P-Value   
       Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean  Median     of T-Diff 
       s.d.   s.d.   s.d.    
     
Pre-IPO CEO Stock-Option Ownership (as a fraction of no. of Pre-IPO shares outstanding + all granted stock Options) 
    (Stock Options Granted      0.006 0.000  0.003 0.000  0.007 0.000 0.048  
    More than 1 Year before IPO)     0.017   0.010   0.018    
    (Stock Options Granted      0.013 0.000  0.010 0.000  0.014 0.001 0.188 
    During 1 Year before IPO)     0.032   0.029   0.033    
    (IPO Stock Options)     0.004 0.000  0.019 0.010  0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.015   0.026   0.000    
All Granted Stock Options      0.023 0.012  0.031 0.018  0.021 0.008 0.017 
0.038   0.040   0.037    
 
Post-IPO CEO Stock-Option Ownership (as a fraction of no. of Post-IPO shares outstanding + all granted stock Options) 
    (Stock Options Granted      0.004 0.000  0.002 0.000  0.005 0.000 0.059  
    More than 1 Year before IPO)     0.012   0.008   0.013    
    (Stock Options Granted      0.010 0.000  0.007 0.000  0.011 0.001 0.158  
    During 1 Year before IPO)     0.026   0.021   0.027    
    (IPO Stock Options)     0.003 0.000  0.012 0.007  0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.010   0.016   0.000    
All Granted Stock Options      0.017 0.008  0.022 0.014  0.016 0.006 0.076  
0.029   0.028   0.029    
 
Panel D – Offering Characteristics     
 Pre-IPO Sales Revenue     105.5 14.9  119.621 19.917  101.063 13.530   0.778   
    (in Million USD)      583.3   456.496   618.346    
 Pre-IPO Leverage       0.297 0.145  0.297 0.195  0.298 0.131   0.986      
    (Total Debt/Total Asset)     0.496   0.397   0.524    
 Participation Ratio      0.076 0.000  0.107 0.000  0.067 0.000   0.031 
       0.165   0.215   0.145    
 Overhang       4.710 3.966  4.619 3.469  4.738 4.075   0.812 
       4.449   8.055   2.404    
 Hi-tech dummy      0.379 0.000  0.240 0.000  0.423 0.000   0.001 
       0.486   0.429   0.495    
 Underwriter Ranking      0.375 0.000  0.394 0.000  0.369 0.000   0.638 
       0.485   0.491   0.483    
 Gross Proceeds      64.906 36.500  49.935 31.100  69.609 39.000   0.190 
       133.501   74.310   147.047    
 Specific Use of Proceeds     0.458 0.425  0.538 0.608  0.433 0.380   0.020 
       0.398   0.386   0.399    
Panel E – Market Conditions     
 Market Return      0.015 0.020  0.019 0.027  0.014 0.018   0.343 
       0.042   0.042   0.043    
 Bubble dummy      0.411 0.000  0.240 0.000  0.465 0.000   0.000  
       0.493   0.429   0.500    
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Table III. CEO IPO Option Schemes             
This table provides descriptive statistics for the 104 issuing firms with stock options at IPOs over the period 1997 -2004. Underpricing per Share (in USD) is equal to the difference between the offer 
price and the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. Money left on the Table is equal to the product of the Total Number of New Shares Offered and the Underpricing per Share in USD. Gross 
Proceeds is calculated at the offer price. Number of IPO Options granted is the number of stock options granted to CEOs around the IPO date. Discount on the IPO options is equal to the difference (as a 
percentage and in USD, respectively ) between the offer price and the exercise price of the options. Gain from IPO Underpricing is equal to the product of the number of IPO options and the 
underpricing per share. Loss from Underpricing due to pre-IPO ownership is equal to the number of secondary shares sold by the CEO, plus the number of primary shares offered multiplied by the 
CEO’s portion of total shares retain ed by the company (including options granted prior to the IPO and excluding all secondary shares). The Net Gain from IPO Underpricing  is the difference between 
the Gain from IPO Underpricing  and the Loss from Underpricing  due to pre-IPO Ownership . Gain (Value - Cost) using the SEC method at the 10% Growth rate (in USD)  is calculated based on the 
difference between the theoretically calculated value and the exercise price of granted stock options, and the Net Gain from IPO Options (Gain - Loss) is calculated after deducting the Loss from 
Underpricing  due to pre-IPO CEO Ownership .   
          Mean   Median   Std-dev   
Panel A – Offering Characteristics    
  Underpricing per Share (in USD)        5.50     0.84     17.58  
  Total Number Shares Offered       4,669,435    3,500,000   4,546,252  
  Total Number of New Shares Offered      3,869,919    3,000,000   3,553,062   
  CEO’s Percentage of Shares Retained in Company     18.4%    11.2%   18.7% 
  Money left on the Table         32,165,930    2,987,509    121,452,229       
  Gross Proceeds         66,860,856    40,000,000    92,207,662 
 
Panel B – IPO Option Grants 
  Number of IPO Options granted         149,163   100,000   185,735 
  Discount on the IPO options (Exercise Price versus Offer Price) (%)   2.91%    0.00%   14.00% 
  Discount on the IPO options (Exercise Price versus Offer Price) (in USD)    0.215    0.00   1.109 
 
Panel C – Gain and Loss to CEO from Underpricing 
  Gain from Underpricing         693,901    55,306     2,032,525  
  Loss from Underpricing due to pre-IPO CEO Ownership     525,917    328,950    777,358 
    Net Gain from IPO Underpricing (Gain - Loss)     167,983    (167,371)   2,177,979 
  
Panel D – Gain from IPO Grants to CEO 
  Gain (Value - Cost) using the SEC method at the 10% Growth rate (in USD)   3,011,485    1,673,430    4,508,164 
    Net Gain from IPO Options (Gain - Loss)       2,485,568    1,416,372    4,483,050    
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Table IV.  Underpricing in Relation to the Existence of IPO Options, Board Independence 
and VC Backing       
The table provides descriptive statistics on underpricing in relation to the existence of IPO option grants, board 
independence and venture capital involvement. Panel A reports the average (and standard deviation between 
parentheses ) for underpricing in relationship to the existence of IPO option grants and above- and below-median 
board independence. Panel B reports the average (and standard deviation in parentheses ) for underpricing in relation 
to the existence of IPO option grants and VC backing. P-values for the differences in means across sub-samples are 
reported in italic.    
Panel A – Underpricing in Relation to IPO Options and Board Independence 
                      IPO Options                 
     No    Yes   
     N Mean   N  Mean             P-Value 
      (s.d.)    (s.d.)           of T-Diff 
Board Independence        
          I       II               I vs. II 
Low     169 0.548   49 0.548  0.999 
      (0.817)    (0.975)   
       
        III       IV                  III vs. IV 
High     162 0.242   55 0.090  0.036 
      (0.527)    (0.139)    
 
                          II vs. III                I vs. III                        II vs. IV                I vs. IV 
P-Value of T-Diff   0.005  0.000    0.001  0.000  
 
Panel B – Underpricing in Relation to IPO Options and Venture Capital Involvement 
                      IPO Options                 
     No    Yes   
     N Mean   N  Mean             P-Value 
      (s.d.)    (s.d.)           of T-Diff 
VC backed IPOs         
          I       II               I vs. II 
 No    109 0.158   57 0.109  0.416 
      (0.437)    (0.137)   
        
        III       IV               III vs. IV 
 Yes    222 0.517   47 0.544  0.835 
       (0.781)    (1.002)    
     
                          II vs. III                I vs. III                        II vs. IV                I vs. IV 
P-Value of T-Diff   0.000  0.000    0.002  0.000  
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Table V.  Impact of Board Independence and IPO Options on Underpricing 
The sample consists of 435 IPOs between 1997 and 2004. The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the ratio of the difference between 
the stock price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. The table controls for the differential effect of board 
independence on the association between underpricing and the ex ante gain from the IPO option grants. Ex ante Gain from Underpricing is equal 
to the number of IPO options. The Independent Board dummy is equal to one if board independence is higher than the median of 0.467, and zero 
otherwise. Ex ante Loss from Underpricing is equal to the number of secondary shares sold by the CEO plus the number of primary shares 
offered multiplied by the CEO’s portion of total shares retained in the company (including options granted prior to the IPO and excluding all 
secondary shares) . Both the gain and loss are in millions and are divided by the offer price.  All other variables are defined as in table II. 
Heteroskedasticity -consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided test ), respectively.  
        (1)  (2)    
Constant       0.350*** 0.326** 
        0.136  0.136  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing     -0.067  0.275* 
        0.195  0.158  
Independent Board dummy      -0.160*** -0.140*** 
        0.051  0.052  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x Independent Board dummy     -0.574* 
          0.317  
Ex ante Loss from Underpricing     -0.031*   -0.031* 
        0.018  0.018  
Price Revision       0.917*** 0.919*** 
        0.127  0.127  
CEO Pre-IPO Ownership       -0.001  -0.004  
        0.117  0.118  
Overhang       0.005  0.005  
        0.006  0.006  
Log (1 + Sales)       -0.010*   -0.010* 
        0.005  0.005  
Participation Ratio      -0.292** -0.278** 
        0.122  0.122  
Specific Use of Proceeds      -0.219*** -0.220*** 
        0.083  0.083  
Pre-IPO Leverage       -0.053*   -0.048* 
        0.031  0.029  
Hi-tech dummy        0.079*   0.080* 
        0.047  0.047  
VC dummy        0.063  0.061  
        0.046  0.046  
Underwriter Ranking       0.132**  0.131** 
        0.061  0.061  
Bubble dummy        0.260*** 0.265*** 
        0.066  0.066  
Market Return        1.084**  1.111** 
        0.544  0.555    
Adjusted R-squared      0.443  0.444  
F-statistic       24.044  22.658  
Prob(F-statistic)       0.000  0.000    
Number of observations      435  435    
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Table VI.  Impact of Venture Capital firms Involvement and IPO Options  on Underpricing  
The sample consists of 435 IPOs between 1997 and 2004. The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the ratio of the difference between 
the stock price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. The table controls for the possible differential effect of 
venture capital (VC) firm characteristics on the link between underpricing and the ex ante gain from the IPO option grants. The VC-related 
Directors dummy is equal to one if the fraction of VC-related directors on the board of directors is higher than the median value of 16.7%, and 
zero otherwise. The VC dummy is equal to one if the IPO firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise. The CEO related to VCs dummy is equal to one 
if the CEO is related to one of the VC firms backing the firm, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in Table II and Table V. 
Heteroskedasticity -consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided test ), respectively.  
       (3)  (4)  (5)   
Constant       0.173*  0.447*  0.488*** 
       0.102  0.150  0.130  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing     -0.252*  -0.282  -0.221  
       0.147  0.190  0.178  
VC-related Directors dummy     0.200***     
       0.051      
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x VC-related Directors dummy  0.536*     
       0.306      
VC dummy        0.036    
         0.050    
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x VC dummy     0.377*   
         0.217    
CEO related to VCs dummy         0.121  
           0.152  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x CEO related to VCs dummy      2.490* 
           1.510  
Ex ante Loss from Underpricing      -0.034*  -0.034**  -0.028*  
       0.021  0.019  0.017  
Board Independence        -0.356***  -0.376*** 
         0.110  0.095  
Price Revision      0.919***  0.933***  0.921*** 
       0.126  0.125  0.127  
CEO Pre-IPO Ownership     0.078  -0.018  -0.040  
       0.110  0.118  0.109  
Overhang       0.005  0.005  0.004  
       0.006  0.006  0.005  
Log (1 + Sales)      -0.010*  -0.010*  -0.010*  
       0.006  0.006  0.006  
Participation Ratio       -0.281**  -0.314**  -0.323** 
       0.117  0.125  0.123  
Specific Use of Proceeds     -0.203**  -0.219***  -0.218*** 
       0.079  0.083  0.077  
Pre-IPO Leverage       -0.048*  -0.053**  -0.053*  
       0.028  0.031  0.030  
Hi-tech dummy      0.089*  0.082*  0.093* 
       0.053  0.048  0.055  
Underwriter Ranking       0.127**  0.133**  0.132** 
       0.061  0.061  0.059  
Bubble dummy      0.251***  0.260***  0.246*** 
       0.066  0.066  0.067  
Market Return       1.220**  0.987**  0.934* 
       0.551  0.491  0.545   
Adjusted R-squared      0.448  0.442  0.457  
F-statistic       24.518  22.500  23.787  
Prob(F-statistic)      0.000  0.000  0.000   
Number of observations     435  435  435   
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Table VII.  Impact of CEO Entrenchment and IPO Options  on Underpricing 
The sample consists of 435 IPOs between 1997 and 2004. The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the ratio of the difference between 
the stock price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. The table controls for t he differential effect of CEO 
characteristics on the link between underpricing and the ex ante gain from the IPO option grants. All variables are defined in Table II and Table 
V. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided test ), respectively.  
       (6)  (7)  (8)   
Constant       0.411***  0.436***  0.422*** 
       0.140  0.144  0.140  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing     -0.200  -0.232  -0.241  
       0.208  0.216  0.198  
CEO Founder dummy      0.028      
       0.059      
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x CEO Founder dummy   0.474*     
       0.281      
CEO Chairman dummy       -0.019    
         0.059    
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x CEO Chairman dummy     0.502*   
         0.301    
CEO Founder Chairman dummy         0.022  
           0.068  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing x CEO Founder Chairman dummy      0.698* 
           0.380  
Ex ante Loss from Underpricing     -0.033*  -0.034*  -0.033*  
       0.019  0.019  0.019  
Board Independence      -0.332***  -0.350***  -0.339*** 
       0.109  0.109  0.110  
Price Revision      0.927***  0.929***  0.933*** 
       0.125  0.126  0.125  
CEO Pre-IPO Ownership     -0.031  -0.015  -0.032  
       0.121  0.122  0.121  
Overhang       0.005  0.005  0.005  
       0.006  0.006  0.006  
Log (1 + Sales)      -0.010*  -0.010*  -0.010*  
       0.005  0.006  0.005  
Participation Ratio       -0.315**  -0.311**  -0.329** 
       0.125  0.129  0.129  
Specific Use of Proceeds     -0.222***  -0.225***  -0.227*** 
       0.082  0.084  0.083  
Pre-IPO Leverage       -0.050*  -0.047*  -0.047*  
       0.029  0.027  0.028  
Hi-tech dummy      0.078*  0.082*  0.078* 
       0.045  0.049  0.045  
VC dummy      0.050  0.046  0.044  
       0.048  0.048  0.048  
Underwriter Ranking       0.130**  0.133**  0.131** 
       0.061  0.062  0.061  
Bubble dummy      0.263***  0.262***  0.263*** 
       0.065  0.066  0.065  
Market Return       1.026*  1.018*  1.065** 
       0.562  0.559  0.526   
Adjusted R-squared      0.442  0.441  0.443  
F-statistic       21.226  21.171  21.313  
Prob(F-statistic)      0.000  0.000  0.000   
Number of observations     435  435  435   
 
 
 
44 
Table VIII.  Impact of VC Characteristics, VC Reputation and IPO Options on 
Underpricing 
The sample consists of 435 IPOs between 1997 and 2004. The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the ratio of the difference between 
the stock price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. The table controls for the differential effect of venture 
capital (VC) firm characteristics on the link between underpricing and the ex ante gain from the IPO option grants. The VC-related Directors 
dummy is equal to one if the fraction of VC-related directors on the board of directors is higher than the median value of 16.7%, and zero 
otherwise. The VC dummy is equal to one if the IPO firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise. The CEO related to VCs dummy is equal to one if the 
CEO is related to one of the VC firms backing the firm, and zero otherwise. The Old VC dummy (Young VC dummy) is equal to 1 if the average 
age of the VC firms for a specific IPO is higher (lower) than the sample median VC age of 12 years, and zero otherwise. All other variables are 
defined in Table II and Table V. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided test ), respectively. 
        (9)  (10)  (11)   
Constant       0.168  0.444***  0.427*** 
       0.124  0.149  0.134  
Ex ante Gain from Underpricing     -0.246*  -0.286  -0.239  
       0.147  0.192  0.185  
VC-related Directors dummy     0.165***     
       0.055      
VC dummy        -0.009    
         0.062    
CEO related to VCs dummy         0.177  
           0.133  
Old VC dummy      0.067  0.087  0.068  
       0.067  0.075  0.062  
 
Ex ante Gain x VC -related Directors dummy x Old VC dummy  0.223      
       0.362      
Ex ante Gain x VC -related Directors dummy x Young VC dummy  1.615*     
       0.953 
Ex ante Gain x VC dummy x Old VC dummy     0.214    
         0.314    
Ex ante Gain x VC dummy x Young VC dummy     1.089*   
         0.643    
Ex ante Gain x CEO related to VCs dummy x Old VC dummy      4.075  
           5.149  
Ex ante Gain x CEO related to VCs dummy x Young VC dummy      0.951* 
            0.554  
Ex ante Loss from Underpricing     -0.034*  -0.034*  -0.033*  
       0.020   0.020   0.020  
Board Independence        -0.346***  -0.337*** 
          0.109  0.098  
Price Revision      0.930***  0.940***  0.910*** 
       0.127  0.126  0.133  
Pre-IPO CEO Ownership     0.089  -0.011  -0.002  
       0.113  0.119  0.113  
Overhang       0.005  0.005  0.005  
       0.006  0.006  0.006  
Log (1 + Sales)      -0.010*  -0.010*  -0.010*  
       0.006  0.006  0.006  
Participation Ratio       -0.271**  -0.306**  -0.306*** 
       0.117  0.125  0.119  
Specific Use of Proceeds     -0.200**  -0.215***  -0.206*** 
       0.078  0.083  0.075  
Pre-IPO Leverage       -0.049*  -0.056*  -0.060*  
       0.030  0.031  0.031  
Hi-tech dummy      0.090*  0.086*  0.096* 
       0.053  0.051  0.055  
Bubble dummy      0.253***  0.259***  0.248*** 
       0.067  0.065  0.063  
Underwriter Ranking       0.128**  0.138**  0.139** 
       0.062  0.063  0.062  
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Table VIII—Continued  
        (9)  (10)  (11)   
Market Return       1.173**  0.938*  0.912* 
       0.549  0.545  0.545   
Adjusted R-squared      0.449  0.442  0.454  
F-statistic       21.818  20.089  21.069  
Prob(F-statistic)      0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations     435  435  435   
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Table IX. Pre-IPO CEO Stock Option Schemes     
The table provides descriptive statistics for 304 IPOs with CEO stock options granted during the year prior to the IPO and the period before the year prior to the IPO. The table reports the mean, median 
and standard deviation for the following variables: the Number of stock options held at the IPO date (Panel A), the Discount on the Stock Options (Offer Price versus Exercise Price) as a percentage and 
in dollars (Panel B and Panel C, respectively), the Net Gain on the Stock Options based on the Offer Price (Panel D), the Total Net Gain on the Stock Options (Value - Exercise Price)  (Panel E), and the 
Firm Size at the IPO (Panel F) as measured by the number of shares outstanding and the market capitalization (at the offer price).  
 
          No. of IPOs Mean  Median  Std-dev   
Panel A - Number of Stock Options held at the IPO date      
Total Number of Stock Options (inc. IPO options)         304    432,556    250,000    618,881  
Stock Options Granted More than 1 Year before IPO     90   293,958    196,018    306,072   
Stock Options Granted During 1 Year before IPO      214   418,354    184,013    699,723   
      
Panel B - Discount on the Stock Options (Offer Price versus Exercise Price) (%)      
Discount on the total Number of Stock Options (inc. IPO options)    304  692%  118%  1833%  
Stock Options Granted More than 1 Year before IPO     90  1596%  400%  3162%  
Stock Options Granted During 1 Year before IPO      214  1235%  279%  6282%  
      
Panel C - Discount on the Stock Options (Offer Price - Exercise Price) (in USD)      
Discount on the total Number of Stock Options (inc. IPO options)    304  4,037,803   1,126,623   9,121,715  
Stock Options Granted More than 1 Year before IPO     90   3,149,591   1,659,257   4,732,294   
Stock Options Granted During 1 Year before IPO      214   4,412,819   1,116,113   10,255,594   
      
Panel D - Net Gain on the Stock Options based on the Offer Price (Value - Offer Price) (Using the SEC method at the 10% Growth rate) (in USD)   
Net Gain on the total Number of Stock Options (inc. IPO options)    304   12,393,898   4,906,006   23,250,611   
Stock Options Granted More than 1 Year before IPO     90   7,903,523   4,532,264   10,636,466   
Stock Options Granted During 1 Year before IPO      214   12,818,847   3,843,383   26,466,606   
      
Panel E - Total Net Gain on the Stock Options (Value - Exercise Price) (Using the SEC method at the 10% Growth rate) (in USD)     
Net Gain on the total Number of Stock Options (inc. IPO options)    304   16,431,701   6,056,491   32,178,042   
Stock Options Granted More than 1 Year before IPO     90   11,053,114   6,582,875   15,261,061   
Stock Options Granted During 1 Year before IPO      214   17,231,667   5,010,707   36,570,923   
 
Panel F – Firm Size at IPO 
Number of Shares outstanding        304  21,858,556   15,678,332   23,024,405 
Market Capitalization (in USD)       304   317,286,626   185,216,371   433,608,819 
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Table X.  Corporate Governance and CEO Stock Options       
The sample consists of 435 IPOs between 1997 and 2004. The dependent variable is Underpricing defined as the ratio of the difference between the stock price at the end of the 
first day of trading and the offer price over the offer price. The table controls for the differential effects on underpricing of board independence, the fraction of VC-related directors, 
and the power of the CEO, using the value of two categories of stock options: (1) those granted to the CEO at the IPO via Log(1+Val. IPO Options) , and (2) those granted to the 
CEO during the year prior to IPO via Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted during 1 Y  before IPO). The table also controls for the effect on underpricing of the value of stock options before 
the year of the IPO via Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted More than 1 Y before IPO). All other variables are defined in Table II and Table V.  All stock option values are calculated using 
the SEC method assuming a 10% growth rate. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided test), respectively. 
          (12)  (13)  (14)    
Constant        0.303**  0.247**  0.495*** 
         0.135  0.125  0.141  
Independent Board dummy       -0.027      
         0.061      
VC related Directors dummy         0.169***   
           0.066    
CEO Founder Chairman dummy           -0.045  
             0.075  
Log(1+Val. IPO options)       0.083  -0.050*   -0.038  
         0.092  0.027  0.043  
Log(1+Val. IPO options) x Independent Board dummy    -0.136*      
         0.081      
Log(1+Val. IPO options) x VC related Directors dummy      0.128*    
           0.076    
Log(1+Val. IPO options) x CEO Founder Chairman dummy        0.208* 
             0.124  
Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted during 1 Y before IPO)    0.036*   -0.046*   -0.019  
         0.021  0.028  0.028  
Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted during 1 Y before IPO) x Indep. Board dummy  -0.111**    
         0.049      
Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted during 1 Y before IPO) x VC-related directors dummy    0.041*    
           0.024    
Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted during 1 Y before IPO) x CEO Founder Chairman dummy     0.029  
             0.078  
 
Log(1+Val. Opt. Granted More than 1 Y before IPO)    -0.062*   -0.075** -0.060* 
         0.034  0.035  0.034  
Board Independence           -0.374*** 
             0.113  
Price Revision        0.901*** 0.923*** 0.942*** 
         0.131  0.129  0.126  
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Table X—Continued   
          (12)  (13)  (14)    
Pre-IPO CEO Ownership        -0.127*   -0.063  -0.161* 
         0.076  0.092  0.092  
Overhang        0.003  0.004  0.003  
         0.005  0.005  0.005  
Log (1 + Sales)        -0.010*   -0.010*   -0.010* 
         0.005  0.006  0.006  
Participation Ratio       -0.237*   -0.256** -0.323** 
         0.135  0.128  0.142  
Specific Use of Proceeds       -0.227*** -0.215*** -0.245*** 
         0.082  0.080  0.084  
Pre-IPO Leverage         -0.052*   -0.053*   -0.041* 
         0.030  0.030  0.024  
Hi-tech dummy         0.076*   0.089*   0.081* 
         0.044  0.052  0.048  
VC dummy         0.077    0.037  
         0.049    0.052  
Underwriter Ranking        0.109*   0.104*   0.101* 
         0.061  0.060  0.059  
Bubble dummy         0.278*** 0.258*** 0.263*** 
         0.064  0.063  0.062  
Market Return         1.146**  1.247**  1.047* 
         0.552  0.545  0.524   
Adjusted R-squared       0.454  0.453  0.447  
F-statistic        20.984  22.038  19.357  
Prob(F -statistic)        0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations       435  435  435   
 
